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Abstract: Parliamentary opposition plays a central role within a functioning 
representative democracy. However, research on it seems to lack theoretical 
progression and outlook. Attempts to develop Dahl’s (1966) initial theoretical 
work further are scarce; most recent works by Blondel (1997), and Helms 
(2004) share Dahl’s approach of  referring exclusively to constitutional and 
institutional aspects of opposition, determined by a countries political, party 
and electoral system.  
I will argue on the basis of own research that there is need to add another 
dimension which considers individual parties’ ideology, history, the party 
group members’ socio-economic background, their informal rules of 
engagement etc., as well as more recent theories on agenda-setting (Döring 
2005) and veto-player rights (Tsebelis 1995). My research on opposition 
parties in the Bavarian State parliament (Steinack 2006, 2007) shows 
contrasting behaviour patterns of the different party groups: While the Social 
Democrats focused on a strategy of matter-of-fact cooperation and in some 
controversial legislative cases sought to intermediate, the Green party group 
chose confrontational power politics which had their main effect outside of 
parliament. Those significant differences raise the question to what extent 
party identities and policies coincide with the preference of one opposition 
strategy over another. 
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1. Theoretical background 
 
Parliamentary opposition plays a central role within a functioning 
representative democracy. However, ever since Dahl’s (1966) initial work on 
this topic his complaint that “the analysis of the characteristics of opposition 
(…) has advanced rather less than other aspects of comparative politics” is 
still true.  
Research on opposition seems to lack theoretical progression and outlook. 
The discourse is dominated by non-comparative empirical studies on 
opposition in parliament with focus on new democracies (e.g. Barber 1997; 
Spence 1997; Racz 1993, 2000) and analyses on the representation of 
minority interests in the European Union (e.g. Mair 1997; Neunreither 1998). 
Theoretical work on opposition normally either tends to focus on patters of 
opposition within the political system as such (Dahl 1966, Blondel 1997, 
Helms 2004) or (especially in the German discourse) to look at specific 
opposition strategies detached from specific political systems (Sternberger 
1956, Kirchheimer 1980, Oberreuter 1975, Steffani 1987). The latter approach 
in general would assume that – in order to take over power from government 
– opposition parties would have to behave somewhere along the three 
aspects of fundamental opposition, competition with the majority and 
cooperation with the majority.1 
In defining opposition’s appearance, characteristics, goals and strategies Dahl 
(1966) follows a rather static approach. He identifies four important system 
characteristics (organizational cohesion, competitiveness, site for the 
encounter between opposition and governing majority, the opposition’s 
distinctiveness) and looks at how the opposition’s goals and choice of sites 
combined with those characteristics will produce a specific choice of strategy 
(1966, 332-247)). In doing so, he focuses on the political system as such, 
                                                 
1
 Kirchheimer (1980, 410) differs between parliamentary opposition, opposition as principle 
and a decaying of opposition as a consequence of classical parliamentary cartel 
agreements. Oberrreuter (1975, 20) differs between issue-oriented ad-hoc opposition, 
cooperative opposition and competitive opposition. Steffani (1987, 428) separates out: 
loyal vs. fundamental opposition, parliamentary opposition vs. opposition outside of 
parliament without an explicit mandate of voters, and systematically vs. situation-
orientated opposition which seems comparable to Oberreuter’s Ad-Hoc-Opposition. 
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linking the different characteristics to typical countries where such an 










Dahl acknowledges that opposition strategies and citizen’s attitude to 
opposing government policies are heavily linked to a country’s political culture 
and influenced by societal cleavages (1966, 352f., 357f.). However, he does 
not attribute them to specific parties within a system. His static approach is 
shared by Blondel who both simplifies Dahl’s theoretical concept and extends 
it beyond western democracies, but who remains to see opposition as “a 
‘dependent’ concept” that is “tied to the character of the government” (1997, 
463).  
Even though Helms’ (2004, 24) explicitly points out “theoretical and analytical 
shortcomings of the comparative opposition literature” his contribution on this 
topic which focuses on the constitutional level and describes five different 
types and forms of legitimate opposition to the government, again refers to 
specific countries (UK, Germany, Fifth French Republic, USA and 
Switzerland), instead of choosing a broader approach.  
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By referring exclusively to constitutional and institutional aspects of 
opposition, determined by a countries political, party and electoral system, 
these authors elude the question whether different kinds of parliamentary 
opposition, displayed by competing parties, might be visible within one 
political system.  
In the following I am going to refer to results of empirical research I conducted 
on opposition in the Bavarian State Parliament. Those findings show that in 
contrast to the theoretical models discussed above there are great variations 
as to how opposition party groups behave within one political system. It will 
become evident that it is necessary to extend the institutional focus shown 
above by another dimension which will take into account individual parties’ 
ideology, history, the party group members’ socio-economic background, their 
informal rules of engagement etc. Looking at those characteristics will enable 
me to discuss to what extent differences in parliamentary parties’ identities 
coincide with the preference of one opposition strategy over another and – 
even more important – what determines them. 
2. Empirical Findings – the case of Bavaria 
Amongst Germany’s sixteen federal states Bavaria has been and still is 
playing a special role in German history and politics. Its main elements are 
whether there is a specific Bavarian political culture (Falter 1982,1988; 
Gebhard 1986; Mintzel 1987a, b), the unquestioned hegemony of the 
‘Bavarian State Party’ CSU which heavily influences party competition within 
the state (Mintzel 1998) and specific features of Bavarian electoral law which 
favours mass parties over smaller ones (Hübner 1979; Aulehner 1991; Ender 
& Schultze 1991). Finally, the outstanding position of the Bavarian First 
Minister who – as opposed to his colleagues in the other German Länder – 
may not be forced out of office by a motion of no-confidence has to be 
mentioned (Mielke 1971, 15; Rausch 1977, 396ff., Ender & Schultze 1991, 
154). 
In no other German State Parliament majorities seem to be as clear and 
persistent as in Bavaria (Schindler 1999 I, 1439ff). Since 1957 the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) has been continuously in opposition which is a 
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Europe wide record of parliamentary defeats. The hegemony of the 
conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) seems to remain unquestioned 
after the party managed to win a 2/3 majority in the 2003 state elections 
(Rieger 2003). The predominant role of the CSU which has been governing 
for more than half of a century questions common findings on parliamentary 
opposition. As most of them have been developed in the face of coalition 
governments in the Bundestag and in several state parliaments, it was 
uncertain to what extent the results are applicable for the Bavarian State 
Parliament. 
It is common opinion that parliamentary opposition actions within a frame 
which is defined by a triad of the opposition tasks: critique, control and 
alternative (Sternberger 1956, 134) Research in parliamentarianism as well as 
the international comparison of party politics and research in elites is 
dominated by theses supporting the cooperation of opposition members of 
parliament with those of the governing party or parties (Helms 1997, 45 f.). 
Quite often, joint resolution of problems is achieved both through the 
opposition’s constructive cooperative behaviour towards legislative drafts of 
the government and society’s pressure to solve complex issues consensually. 
Taking into consideration that several of those resolutions clearly reflect 
oppositional ideas some researchers even pronounce a co-governing of 
opposition (von Beyme 1997, 264, Sebaldt 1992a,b). This oppositional trend 
to cooperate is equally evident in parliaments which – like the British House of 
Commons – are governed by one party only (Helms 1997, 200).  
Based on these findings it seems plausible to expect cooperative behaviour 
of the opposition in the Bavarian State Parliament towards the absolute 
majority of the CSU. The hypothesis of cooperation is furthermore underlined 
by the continuing hegemonic role of the CSU:  In the light of permanently 
disillusioning election results there is hardly any hope for the opposition 
parties to take power.2 The ‘alternative function’ as one of the classical 
opposition tasks thus seems more or less irrelevant. In contrast, given the 
                                                 
2
  The 2003 elections to the state parliament are symptomatic for the opposition’s limited 
chances to win: The slogan used by the Bavarian SPD, ‘Macht braucht Kontrolle’ (power 
needs control), sent clear signals that the party did not seek to come into government but 
aimed to prevent a 2/3 CSU majority. 
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unequivocal majority the only way to influence politics in the Bavarian State 
Parliament seems to be cooperation  
2.1 Methodological approach 
My analysis focused on the 13th electoral term (1994-1998). This period is set 
long enough in the past to allow some completeness for both the parliament’s 
archive and the archives of interest groups involved.3 Additionally, it made it 
possible to judge the interactions of the governing majority and opposition 
parties in the context of German national politics since the mid 1990s – a 
period not anymore directly influenced by the impacts of the Unification 
process. The analysis was restricted to the party groups represented in the 
13th Bavarian State Parliament: CSU, SPD and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
(Greens).4 
Studies looking at opposition in the German Bundestag show that the 
complex interaction of political constellations and action strategies can best 
be analysed by choosing a multidimensional approach and combining 
different qualitative and quantitative methods of research (e.g. Sebaldt 
1992a). I consequently worked with a similar approach: This contained a 
quantitative analysis of all initiatives (legal bills, proposals etc.) the parliament 
handled within this period as well as a qualitative in-detail analysis of several 
selected legal bills. In contrast to several projects which had examined 
opposition in the German Bundestag however, I did not take a random sample 
of legal bills but focused on theoretically relevant parameters: I analysed all 
legal bills where both the majority (either the government or the CSU party 
group) and at least one of the opposition parties SPD or Greens had provided 
a draft. Based on those guidelines nine topics emerged which were 
addressed in 21 (out of 181) drafts for legal bills. Apart from all parliamentary 
papers linked to those drafts, additional press-releases, media-reports and 
comments of NGOs relating to the bill were consulted. As a second pillar of 
                                                 
3
  Governmental files weren’t made available due to the general 30 year block up period; 
access to internal material produced by the party groups was limited. 
4
  Even though the merger of the former West German Green Party with the East German 
Civil Rights movement Bündnis 90, as formed in 1993, officially carries the name Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen its party members in the Bavarian State Parliament kept and keep referring 
to themselves as ‘Greens’. 
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analysis I conducted qualitative interviews with 21 members of parliament and 
clerks. Issues explored in those interviews were - among others - the party 
groups image and functioning and the interviewees’ judgment of the 
opposition parties’ efforts. (FOLIE) 
2.2 Parameters of opposition influence in the Bavarian State Parliament 
Based on the MPs’ statements and underlined by the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of parliamentary papers I could identify several levels and 
strategies of opposition influence. These levels and strategies are 
distinguished by a specific combination of places and modes of opposition 
influence: 
• The strategy of power-oriented politics focused on confrontation in the 
plenary and on mobilising the public outside parliament. 
• The matter-of-fact cooperation sought to change things within 
parliament through cooperation in committees and by trying to 
influence decision making in non-public areas aside from the 
committees.  
The analysis showed that both strategies could cause the CSU to change its 
position. However, the opposition parties’ success was normally limited to 
small objective changes in the majority’s legal bills and the CSU-majority 
refused stronger programmatic changes to its politics through SPD and Green 
Party. 
STRATEGIES OF OPPOSITION INFLUENCE IN THE BAVARIAN STATE PARLIAMENT 
 Mode of contest Place of contest 
Content-oriented 
politics 
Cooperation Committees and informal 
contacts within parliament 
Power-oriented politics Confrontation Plenary, 
Media and public outside 
parliament  
2.3 Places and Instruments of opposition influence 
Analysing the nine legislative procedures showed that the opposition chose 
very different modes and places of contest depending on the topic. Those can 
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be distinguished between content-oriented (or matter-of fact oriented) and 
power-oriented politics and public and non-public space.  
Instruments used for power-oriented politics were entirely public and mostly 
used outside the parliament and the plenary. Focus of those instruments 
related to objective, content-oriented politics was the non-public area of 
decision making as well as the (public) meetings of the parliament’s specialist 
committees.  
The lack of instruments used for power-oriented politics in the non-public area 
of decision making can be explained by two factors: as committee sessions in 
the Bavarian State Parliament are open for the public the MPs’ space for non-
public interaction is much smaller than in other assemblies. A further obstacle 
is the absolute majority of the CSU government whose unity – unlike coalition-
governments in other assemblies – is much harder to split over controversial 
topics. 
Even though the interviewees didn’t label the two different levels of 
influence (political power/objective content) explicitly as such, their comments 
and the analysis of the empirical material showed that different strategies are 
used in different places. 
The interviewees thought the plenary to be a place of confrontation where 
MPs meet under the prefix of party-politics.5 Political contents were discussed 
only during the second (and more rarely third) reading of legal bills. Aside 
from this, the opposition parties used the opportunity to scrutinise the 
government’s politics during question time. The interviewees’ perception of 
this is underlined by a qualitative analysis of plenary debates in the second 
half of 1996. 
In contrast, discussions in committees showed a much higher influence by 
representatives of SPD and Green party. Apart from legislative bills which, in 
their majority were introduced by the government, more than 70% of all 
parliamentary initiatives discussed during this election period (most 
prominently. amendments to legal bills) were initiated by the opposition. In line 
with this MPs highlighted that opposition influence could most easily be 
                                                 
5
  See interview 01-290101-B90/Grüne, line 80ff. 
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achieved in committee meetings.6 However, the committees’ 
recommendations are non-binding; the final decision whether an initiative will 
be adopted or not is taken by the plenary. 
 
PLACES AND INSTRUMENTS OF OPPOSITION INFLUENCE IN THE BAVARIAN STATE 
PARLIAMENT 














   Discussions of experts from all 
parliamentary party groups aside 
from committee and plenary 
sessions 
 Lobbying of stakeholders to 
convince the political majority 














 Proposals to amend the 
majority’s draft bills 
 Hearing of experts and lobbyists 
 Plenary discussions 
 
 Launch of press-releases in order 
to alert the media and the public 
 Use of the media by lobbyists to 
support party positions 
 Petitions for referendums 
(sometimes jointly with lobbyists)  
 Initiative to discuss current topics 
in parliament in order to confront 
the government with the 
opposition’s point of view  
 * Though committee sessions formally are public visitors and journalists 
quite often do not attend. 
 
The third pillar of opposition influence was to appeal to and integrate the 
public even prior to initiating a legal bill. The interviewees rated the informal 
influence that could be gained outside parliament as the most important factor 
for influencing governmental decisions.7 Most relevant are contacts to 
professional bodies and associations prior to the preparation of legal bills. 
Once the legislative process has formally started, MPs try to influence voters 
by launching press-releases and media-reports. In exceptional cases this can 
exploited to an extent that parts of the public will support the opposition 
                                                 
6
  See interview 08-150201-SPD, line 93ff. 
7
  See for example interviews 05-050201-SPD, line 354ff., 20-140301-CSU, line 508ff., 01-
290101-B90/Grüne, line 11ff., 17-190301-B90/Grüne, line 200ff. 
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party’s position by launching a petition for a referendum which – if successful 
– might alter the majority’s decision. 
3 Opposition Strategies to enforce political interests 
The public-oriented discussion of political topics in the plenary and outside 
parliament on the one hand and the matter-of-fact discussion with colleagues 
in or prior to committee meetings on the other hand are two contrasting 
benchmarks of opposition strategies. Analysing legislative procedures showed 
that opposition MPs used both paths equally. Out of the nine procedures 
examined four each could be identified clearly as dominated by power-
oriented politics or content-orientated politics, the remaining procedure, a 
revision of Bavaria’s nature conservation law, was discussed on both levels. 
In this context certain topics or interests inevitably entailed certain political 
action strategies: 
The MPs chose the strategy of discussing an issue more objectively if the 
topic was relatively complex and could not be communicated easily to the 
media. This applied for example to a legislative procedure which aimed to 
reduce wrongfully granted subsidies in housing or a procedure intending to 
change the existing law on pollution control. It was also used for an initiative 
to make the promotion of sport for the masses compulsory for local 
governments where parliamentary majority and opposition parties tacitly 
cooperated. The main base for this party-comprehensive cooperation was that 
the legislative matter in question was an issue that was of general interest, 
that it wasn’t programmatically covered by any of the parties and that the topic 
could not be attributed to a specific electorate.  
In contrast, the strategy of power-oriented politics was used for topics with 
a high relevance for society and strong links to at least one of the involved 
party’s programme. The analysed legislative procedures linked to this strategy 
mostly dealt with topics which were linked to a party’s Weltanschauung on this 
matter, such as gender equality, the integration of migrants, or the use of 
genetic engineering. Furthermore discussions on those topics could be 
reduced to clear statements and a few key-words.  
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3.1 Party related differences in the opposition’s appearance 
When comparing the two opposition party groups particular party-specific 
strategies became evident: The interviewees mentioned several 
characteristics in the party groups’ way of presenting themselves. In particular 
CSU MPs thought their Green colleagues to be far more undaunted, agile and 
committed than the members of the SPD. Several of them claimed that it had 
been the Green party group which had confronted the government as 
parliamentary opposition. In contrast the SPD members were described as 
inhibited and less dynamic but more eager to co-operate. At the same time, 
the evaluation of the nine legislative procedures shows that SPD and Greens 
pursued their political goals with different strategies. This indicates that the 
opposition parties are driven by different political cultures which persist 
beyond the 13th legislative term. 
 
3.1.1 The opposition party groups’ image and (self) perception 
The interviewees described the Green MPs quite vividly - in contrast to SPD 
and CSU parliamentarians they were perceived as ‘very intense 
personalities’8, who left both an individual and colourful imprint. Several MPs 
thought this feature linked indirect proportionally to a party group’s size as in 
their opinion the Green MPs’ exposed position in committees was the main 
reason why their appearance gained profile and seemed more disputatious.9 
A social democrat explained that a Green committee member’s request to 
already put that person into an exposed counter-position to the other party 
group’s speakers in this committee.10 Especially CSU-members were 
impressed how the single Green representative in each committee managed 
to cover the various issues discussed:  
‘The Green MPs have to plug away enormously, they can’t afford 
failures, and they are always alone, especially in the committees. 
Regarding work in the committees they will pick special items to deal 
with, that’s the only way to survive, otherwise they would drown in the 
flood of issues discussed. Well, the Greens certainly are perceived 
                                                 
8
  Interview 05-050201 SPD, line 274ff. 
9
  See interview 01-290101 B90/Grüne, line 188f; Interview 09-150201 SPD, line 73ff. 
10
  See interview 11-190201 SPD, line 120ff 
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stronger as opposition (...) I quite admire how they cope. One must be 
very persistent. That’s why I think they are much more snappy and 
hands-on.’11 
In focusing on few side-aspects which they underlined by competent 
argument the Green representatives managed to gain a far sharper 
programmatic outline than their social democratic colleagues. In several 
interviews the Green MPs were labelled as ‘real opposition’ whose successes 
in articulating alternative positions had contributed significantly to sharpening 
the political profile of the party group as a whole.12 They had thus managed to 
convert the burden of being sole-representatives of a position in the 
committee meetings into an advantage. In particular the reason that they did 
not have to go through a time-consuming and diluting co-ordination procedure 
in working groups mirroring the committees, like the two larger party groups, 
allowed the Green parliamentarians a more impertinent, agile opposition 
strategy.13 
According to SPD interviewees the Green MPs had another big bonus: 
Their party group had much more efficient communication structures and 
better, partly more creative, contacts in the media.14 In contrast the SPD – so 
their self-perception – was described in the media as ‘rather boring’15 – 
despite the party’s ambitions and political goals. Even though the SPD had 
(and still has) more staff to do research and prepare political statements and 
despite its large media office the party group’s external communications and 
presentations were perceived as inadequate. One Social Democrat 
complained: ‘It is one of the biggest grievances within the party group that our 
public relations ore too bad. If the people only would understand our good 
intentions they couldn’t vote any other party but the SPD’16 In his opinion the 
main reason for the lack of response his party got in public were the out-dated 
communication structures:  
                                                 
11
  Interview 04-010201 CSU, line 198ff (own translation). 
12
  See interview 04-010201 CSU, line 168ff.; Interview 07-150201 CSU, line 218ff., Interview 
13-120301 CSU, line 248ff. 
13
  Compare Interview 07-150201 CSU, line 227ff. und Interview 05-050201 SPD, line 264ff. 
14
  Compare interviews 05-050201 SPD, line393ff. and 18-240401 SPD, line 202ff. 
15
  Compare interview 18-240401 SPD, line 200ff. 
16
  Interview 05-050201-SPD, line 385ff (own translation) 
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‘Similar to other mass organisations, such as churches and trade unions 
over a long period of time [the SPD has] successfully used 
communication structures which in today’s communication society are 
relatively unsuccessful.  (...) The Green’s advantage is that they never 
had such communication structures. This is most evident for 
organisations such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International; from the 
very beginning their way to communicate was aimed at today’s structure 
of media communication. If I want to point out that the chemical industry 
actually causes too much pollution I don’t write a long paper and send it 
off to all editors; I won’t organise a conference either. Instead, I tie 
myself to a chimney and get the public attention that’s needed. (...) In 
particular the Bavarian SPD is still formed by communication structures 
used 50 years ago.’17 
Overall the SPD parliamentarians didn’t gain much profile in the interviewees’ 
descriptions - keywords as ‘creative’, individual’ or ‘unconventional’ weren’t 
used. In the interviewees’ descriptions the party group more seemed like a 
passive group formed by the spirit of the civil service  with many MPs 
exhausted through long party careers and only a few actively involved in 
opposition work. A SPD MP mentioned that in his opinion the party group was 
lacking younger members and that the long opposition period would suffocate 
any motivation for a personnel or political renewal: 
‘The SPD isn’t attractive for younger or more dynamic people (...) You 
have to imagine: if someone becomes a teacher at 25 and then joins the 
SPD he can become a member of his local party group but even if he 
attends regularly this will get boring at some point. For a teachers it’s 
financially attractive to become a member of the state parliament, even if 
he doesn’t develop his career there any further. But once he is in, it’s 
important to get re-elected. He basically needs to defend his 
constituency and needs to make sure that he won’t loose ground within 
his party, but this rarely happens: once you made it you stay there. They 
[the MPs] stick to one basic attitude – don’t change anything as 
                                                 
17
  Interview 05-050201 SPD, line393ff (own translation). 
The socio-cultural foundation of opposition strategies in parliament 
(K. Steinack, PSA 2008) 
 
 14 
otherwise you might get run over. If we admit a few dynamic youngsters 
what will happen to us?’18 
Externally the SPD party group tried to leave a much more homogenous 
impression than the Green Party which was mainly justified by the electorate’s 
expectations.19 As during the 13th election period the SPD was represented 
with more than one member in any of the committees, the party group was 
able to divide topics between several delegates while focusing on a more 
intensive preparation of the issues discussed. The expert opinions developed 
by the different MPs involved were then discussed in internal party working 
groups where extremist and outsider positions were smoothed down in favour 
of a binding majority opinion which was then presented externally.20 The price 
the Social Democrats paid for their internal party unity was the abandonment 
of extreme positions which would have allowed them to draw clearer borders 
and to gain a clearer profile with respect to the CSU. According to 
representatives of Green Party and CSU the SPD particularly had a much 
weaker profile in content-related questions than the Green Party. At the same 
time the SPD party group showed much more readiness to co-operate with 
the majority and according to CSU-representatives was involved more 
frequently in political decision making. As one CSU politician voiced: One 
could – in contrast to the Greens – get along with the Social Democrats, ‘and 
it’s easier to get along with them. Even if there are a few extreme positions 
within the SPD the larger number of representatives guarantees the sum of 
opinions to be well-balanced.’21  
Apart from the readiness to waive extreme political requests there are two 
reasons which contribute to the SPD party groups willingness to co-operate 
and compromise: According to a CSU-interviewee social democratic 
                                                 
18
  Interview 05-050201 SPD, line 500ff (own translation). 
19
  See interview 21-151001 SPD, line 239ff. 
20
 Votes where single MPs can decide independently without taking the party groups 
guideance on a topic into account are very rare. Interviewees 21-151001 SPD (line 315) 
and 01-290101 B90/Grüne (line 574) pointed out that if a topic was highly controversial 
within the party group there would be general agreement to try and not to discuss this 
topic with the other party groups if possible. 
21
  Originally ‘und mit denen kommen Sie auch leichter zu Rande. Weil die, selbst wenn es da 
einige Extrempositionen gibt bei der SPD, angesichts der doch größeren Zahl der 
Abgeordneten in der Summe wieder ausgewogener sind’, interview 10-160201 CSU, line 
263f. 
The socio-cultural foundation of opposition strategies in parliament 
(K. Steinack, PSA 2008) 
 
 15 
parliamentarians quite often take up mandates and posts on a local level. 
Along with exchanging views with Social Democrats who are in governing 
positions in other German states this nurtures a basic pragmatic approach 
towards the party group’s political strategy. Despite their opposition role this 
political realism causes the SPD to demand things that can be realised.22 
Another reason why SPD representatives might be more eager to 
compromise could be that long-standing SPD members, who have given up 
after years of political opposition, will act along the motto ‘I want to see 
success and not only defeats’23 and are thus more ready to compromise than 
their Green colleagues.  
 
3.1.2 The opposition party groups’ strategic preferences in legislation  
The interviewees’ remarks on the appearance of Social Democrat and Green 
MPs are consistent with the way both parliamentary party groups handled 
selected legislative procedures which has been used as the second central 
indicator for the opposition parties’ strategic preferences. In three out of four 
procedures that were tackled by using a content related strategy with none or 
very limited involvement of the media the SPD had initiated the draft-bill. The 
Greens had initiated only one such draft-bill and this was the only case (out of 
the nine topics examined) where there had been a governmental draft-bill 
prior to a draft provided by the opposition. This delayed initiative of the 
Greens indicates that the eco-party didn’t give priority to content-oriented 
topics that were solved by cooperative discussion. 
In contrast, all four legislative procedures with an element of public 
confrontation were initiated through a Green draft bill which was then followed 
by an initiative of the governmental majority. The SPD had contributed only to 
one of the legislative procedures of that kind with its own draft – a bill to 
guarantee gender equality in the public service.24  
Finally the proceedings to change the bill for the Bavarian Nature 
Conservation Law can be seen as mixture between the content-oriented 
                                                 
22
  Interview 04-012001 CSU, line 194ff. 
23
  Originaly ‘ich will einen Erfolg sehen und nicht immer nur Niederlagen.’, interview 08-
150201-SPD, line 187ff. 
24
  In a further legislative procedure relating to genetic engineering the SPD party group had 
decided to support the Green’s initiative instead of submitting a proposal of its own. 
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strategy of cooperative discussion and the strategy of influence by public 
confrontation: Even though the Green draft bill was discussed extensively in 
party publications, discussions on the planned amendments did not reach the 
wider public. 
Analysing those legislative procedures shows that the Greens preferred a 
strategy of influence by public confrontation in order to implement their 
political ideas. In contrast, the SPD members focused on a content-oriented 
strategy and tried to achieve changes within parliament - in so doing they 
normally sought to co-operate in committee meetings. This was true even 
when the SPD had not submitted a draft bill for the topic in question. For 
example, when discussing amendments to the Nature Conservation Law SPD 
party-group members tried to change the CSU draft by submitting multiple 
proposals. SPD members further acted as intermediaries in CSU and Green 
MPs’ conflictive and highly emotionalised debates on amending the Hunting 
Law. The SPD members’ cooperative engagement in those matters confirms 
results of a quantitative analysis of all legislative proposals for the 13th 
legislative period which showed that significantly more amendments 
submitted by SPD members than by Green parliamentarians got the majority’s 
approval (Steinack 2006, 132ff.). In contrast to the SPD politicians the Green 
MPs abstained from discussing topics where their party group had not 
submitted a legislative proposal and kept to addressing concerns they had 
considering the drafts on the table. In any case they did not try to act as 
intermediaries. 
The socio-cultural foundation of opposition strategies in parliament 
(K. Steinack, PSA 2008) 
 
 17 
THE OPPOSITION PARTY GROUPS’ STRATEGIC PREFERENCES  
 Confrontation Cooperation Hybrid 





Bill on gender 
equality for women 
and men in public 
service 
Change to the 
Bavarian Municipal 
Code to make 
promotion of sport 
for the masses 
compulsory for 
local governments 
Change to the 
Bavarian Pollution 
Control Bill  
Bill  for the cut-rate 
sale of public land 









Bill on gender 
equality for women 
and men in public 
service 
Change to the Bill 
on elections to local 
governments  
Change to the 
Bavarian Hunting 
Bill 






Change to the 
Bavarian Nature 
Conservation Bill  
 * The SPD had adopted the Green’s draft bill 
4 Explanations for partisan differences  
The party groups’ contrasting manners and corresponding party-specific 
strategies of opposition influence can be ascribed to different political cultures 
of SPD and Greens in the Bavarian State Parliament which result from 
specific historic and structural considerations.  
There are several historic-programmatic reasons for the SPD’s focus on a 
content-oriented strategy of cooperative discussion and the Green’s 
preference for a strategy of influence by public confrontation: At the start of 
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the 13th electoral term the Social Democrats were looking back on nearly 40 
years of opposition in the Bavarian State Parliament and none of the party’s 
MPs had ever been a member of a national or state government. Many of the 
SPD representatives had, however, been elected to leading positions in local 
governments prior to joining parliament and their experience on a local level 
that many problems could be solved only in cooperation with the CSU had left 
them more open for compromising and pragmatic decisions. This strong focus 
on political realism and the resulting insight that not everything can be 
realised that might be programmatically desirable has been stressed in 
interviews with several SPD representatives.25  
Another reason for the SPD MPs’ choice of strategy is the fact that the 
party stands in strong competition with the CSU when trying to win votes from 
the political mainstream. In order to succeed both catch-all parties have to 
avoid extreme positions; they mustn’t rely on idealist aims but must focus on 
solutions that are politically realistic. As a result the political discussions of 
both CSU and SPD are inevitably more geared towards Realpolitik (real 
politics) than to political ideals.  
In contrast to the SPD which has its roots in the labour movement of 
imperial Germany (1870s), the Bavarian Greens look back upon a rather short 
party history (Raschke 1993). The Green’s origins in grassroot movements 
and the extra-parliamentary opposition of the late 1960s formed the first years 
of the party in parliament. The Green ideal to be an ‘anti-party’ which aims to 
keep a check on the political system as such has faded while the party 
established itself in parliament. However, at least until the Greens first 
became part of a coalition government on national level (in 1998), the party’s 
electorate expected explicitly left-wing positions. This made it easy for the 
Bavarian Green party to distinguish themselves very clearly from the CSU in 
the fields of security and home affairs, as well as agricultural and 
environmental policy. It did not harm the party’s profile that there were severe 
clashes within the party’s more realistic and more fundamental wing as this is 
something that was tolerated, and even anticipated, by the party’s voters.26 
                                                 
25
  See interview 10-160201 CSU, line 263f. 
26
  According to Raschke 1993, p 203 having several competing wings was internally seen as 
healthy sign for the party’s plurality, heterogeneity and inner party democracy. 
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Even though the Green MPs’ appearance in parliament during the 13th 
electoral term was mostly similar to the one displayed by the CSU and SPD 
MPs many Green representatives still thought extra-parliamentary protest to 
be the right measure to gain attention and reach political change.27  
Adding to this are structural reasons which explain why the opposition party 
groups chose different strategies. One central reason why the social 
democrats focused on the content-oriented strategy of cooperative discussion 
is the party’s bigger number of MPs. As at least six of them were present in 
any of the parliament’s committees the party was able to develop experts for 
many of the topics discussed and to rely on those experts’ knowledge in the 
decision making process. At the same time the number of MPs involved in 
each of those decisions required complex and time-consuming coordination 
within the parliamentary party group and some of the interviewees stressed 
that balancing interests within the party group quite regularly lead to a 
watering down of political interests which made it harder to increase the 
party’s profile in the public.28 
In contrast, the Green party group’s fourteenmembers did not need 
complex coordination as they weren’t allowed to send more than one MP into 
each of the specialist committees who then represented the party-group’s 
opinion. This allowed the Green MPs to argue and act more to the point than 
their social-democrat colleagues. The MPs’ focus on a strategy of influence by 
public confrontation was supported by the party’s and party group’s specific 
culture of discussion. Shortly after the start of the 13th electoral term the party 
group members engaged in intensive internal party strife and discussed their 
clashing opinions on ‘proper opposition politics’ in the media extensively. The 
fact that in focus of their discussion was the question how access to the party 
group’s press office should be handled for MPs underlines the MPs’ ambition 
to act in the public and to discuss things publicly29 
                                                 
27
  During the electoral term Green MPs for example protested outside parliament against 
final storage of radioactive waste and blockaded a slaughterhouse where cattle, potentially 
infected with BSE, were meant to be culled.  
28
  See interview 21-151001 SPD, line 315. 
29
  Having free access for all Green MPs to the party group’s media office was one of the key 
issues which ignited a major internal and public discussion on the party group’s opposition 
strategy in 1996. Compare Steinack 2006, 81 ff. and ‘Fraktionschef und Pressesprecher 
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The Green party groups’ advantage in using the public for political changes 
coincides with the party’s lower engagement in content-oriented politics. 
Interviews with the MPs show that the professional competence of some 
Green MPs (especially regarding discussions on the public budget and on 
social policy) significantly shaped the party group. However, the Greens 
lacked political success in this field as none of the legislative procedures 
analysed showed content-related influence of the Green party. Despite of the 
fact that budget policy is at the heart of any government – and thus much 
harder to influence than any other field of politics the main reason for the 
weak appearance of the Green party group in content-related cooperative 
politics could be the low number of MPs and the party’s limitation to only one 
representative per committee. Among the range of topics discussed in the 
committees the Green MPs would pick on only a few items and in doing so 
they focus on subjects which were likely to meet high response in public and 
which would sharpen the party’s profile as powerful and punchy opposition. 
For rather marginal topics, such as pollution control, the party group simply 
lacked the capacity to accumulate expert knowledge in this field. 
                                                                                                                                            
beziehen Prügel. Die Landtags-Grünen spucken Gift und Galle’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
4.10.1996. 
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EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PARTY GROUPS’ PREFERRED CHOICE OF STRATEGY  
 SPD Green Party 
Party tradition Labour Movement of 
Imperial Germany (1870s) 
Grassroot Movement & 
Extra-Parliamentary 
Opposition (late 1960s) 
Political self-Image Catch All Party ‘Anti-Party’ 
Programmatic focus Moderate politics of the 
mainstream 
Combining of fundamental 
and realistic positions 
Voters’ expectations Political alternative to CSU Controller of Government 
Recruiting of 
candidates 
Long path of inner-
parliamentary qualification 
– candidates need the right 
kind of background and 
pedigree only given to 
those who have served in 
the party for longer periods. 
 
There are multiple avenues 
into politics – party-
membership isn’t a 
prerequisite for MP 
candidates.  
Low number of party-




Many MPs with detailed 
experience of working in a 
local government 
Long standing experience 
in opposition has lead to 
disillusionment and 
resignation. 
MPs are relatively new to 
the business and are slowly 
adjusting to the opposition’s 
course of life.  
 
Size of the 
parliamentary party 
groups and committee 
memberships during 
the 13th electoral term  
70 Members – at least 6 
MPs per specialist 
committee which allows to 
specialise on topics 
14 Members – only one MP 
per specialist committee 
who represents the party 
group’s opinion but can’t 
specialise on all topics 
discussed 




Personal differences are 
dealt with internally. 
Statements for certain 
topics are made by the 
party group’s official 
speakers on the topic.  
Personal differences within 
the party group are 
discussed widely and 
publicly.  
Open access to the party 
group’s media office for all 
MPs is a highly political 
issue. 
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5. Final Considerations and Outlook 
How do those findings fit in with common theories on parliamentary 
opposition?  
• The empirical findings prove common theories regarding cooperation 
and confrontation being the main pillars of opposition behaviour. 
• The results show that different strategies can do exist within one 
political system 
While the results regarding opposition influence in the Bavarian State 
Parliament per se are consistent with existent research, the different profiles 
of political influence open up new questions. Further research is needed to 
explore whether the Green party’s strategy of power-oriented confrontation is 
a typical feature of small opposition party groups while better staffed larger 
party groups are able to mirror the majority’s activities (by establishing 
shadow-posts) with more focus on content and thus greater ability to co-
operate. An important concept in this context could be Döring’s theoretical 
work on agenda-setting agenda-setting (Döring 2005) and Tsebelis’ (2002) 
concept of veto-players. => Outline how those two approaches are reflected in 
my findings. 
 It seems equally possible that party-specific features (such as a party’s 
history, its earlier experiences in politics, its mission statement etc.) are 
relevant for the way opposition is made and perceived in public. Clarifying this 
question is especially relevant for the SPD, the notorious loser of elections to 
the Bavarian State Parliament for more then half a century. It remains unclear 
whether differences between the Bavarian SPD and social-democratic 
regional associations in other German states are responsible for its persistent 
failure or whether this is caused by structural disadvantages of the SPD 
regional association in Bavaria in contrast to the national association CSU (as 
repeatedly claimed by Bavarian SPD politicians). 
I hope to shed light on this question by conducting further research with a 
comparable approach on some other territorial parliaments in the near future 
– this time looking at both Wales and Scotland. Looking at the behaviour of 
opposition party groups in those two assemblies may help to solve some of 
the open questions regarding driving factors behind opposition’s behaviour, 
both in public as well as behind closed doors. 
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